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omen's Studies, like 1ax @ deeply lnte~-cipLina~ Its c a m 1  r n e ~ o d o l o ~  is 8-b td 
ask the feminist question: "What is the sqpilcancnce of this for women?? The m m  is -; 
ineyitably complex because women live varied live. Any &dpk&asy to02 .that w : 
understand this complexity is welcomed. Law servesp both a tool of aady& end i . -' 
subject of i n t ~ g a t i o n .  Asking about women does nbt lead to simplk m-. It - 
'4 , * 
complicates the legal project of deermining rights and rqo11siWties. 
Any lawyer can idenufy the most obvious achievements of a s k g  "the womah 
question" of law One example is the Nineteenth Amendment, a4Eeminist achietmeent. 
Another, more recent, is the disappdnce of explicitly gender-based job se&re&ariuaI in , 
other areas asking about the impact of a legal rule on women's lives has reverled a'spe:[i& i 
of the problem that had been overlooked but seem obvious once described. We ) w e ,  . 
come to understand how critical a womanb control over her reproductive life& to hb , ' 
ability to live on terms of equality with men. We have become skeptical about relying - 
upon the preferences of women to jusafy confining them to l~w-paying, lowat~tus ' 
positions. We now see coercion in sexual kituations that would have been &ought to be ' 
consensual a generation ago. We no longer look at pombgraphy q merely tpe\ + 
exuberant speech of a rebellious male spirit; we notice the woman who is dbpicted, top, 
and her silence. 
WomenS Studies draws on interpretive disciplines that uncover gender bias in ' 
doctrines and descriptions that previously seemed neutral. For example, an historical , 
survey of the tort law of emotional injuries reveals its origins in 19th century *ws that 
describe a husband's stake in marriage as material and a wife's aspurely emotional. 
Emotional injury claims were initially more easily recognizeiwhen they were brought 
by women, but they still are disfavored in a way that may be due to theit association 
with "the weaker sex." 
Often, asking about women reveals how limited the tools of law are when addressing , 
deep inequalities. Thoughtful feminism, like thoughthrl economics, reveals the 
unintended consequences of using law to achieve social change. ~ v e n  when a violation 
of the law seems clear, it can be difficult to find a remedy that furthers the interest of all 
women. Take, for example, the litigation involving state military colleges that led to a 
U. S. Supreme Coun decision in United states v. Virginia The use of state funds tb 
support institutions of higher education that are completelf closed to women made this 
a clear case of gender discrimination. Most of the Supreme Court aped ,  but -the 
justices, and feminists, disagreed on the appropriate solution. Unlike the justices, 
feminists ask which remedy would best improve the status of women. 
The Court ordered the Virginia Military Academy to admit women. The hard 
question, which feminists debate and the Court left unanswered, is over the turns of , . 
that adnussion. The Coun took an equal-access approach, reminiscent of the early 
1970's jurisprudence associated with the opinion's author, Justice Ginsburg. It opened, 
I the doors of the academies "on behalf of ... women" who could succeed in an- 
environment that rewarded aggressive behavior and upper-body strength. In the absmce 
of a comparable state institution geared to leadership training for women, a state must 
permit women to enroll in the male academy This formal equality solution insists only 
that women be permitted to participate if they can meet male standards. W m  who 
fail to conform to the male model can be excluded. - .  
To other feminists, however, gender discrimination at $MI was not merely a quesrion 
of exclusionaty admissions policies. What troubled them is state support for a deeply . ,  
stereotypical view of male-female behavior. If the goal of anti-discrimination hw is 
equality of citizenship, this argument goes, institutions based on gender stereotypes 
should be closed, or the stereotypical behavior should be eliminated in favor of citizen- 
soldier training that assumes many students will be women. 
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In a response that has become a refrain J .D., U"ivr1.sisity of Michigan Law School 
throughout feminist jurisprudence, still other B.A. and M.A., University of Michigan 
feminists responded that closing or 
redesigning VMI for this reason would itself 
perpetuate a stereotypical view of women as 
unsuited for military life. The more radical 
solution, these women argue, is consistent 
with the Court's formal approach: Admit 
women on exactly the same standards as men 
and subject them to exactly the same 
requirements. Subject them to adversative 
education and barracks life. Shave their 
heads. Make no accommodation. The  
disappearance of women into bodies made 
anonymous by uniforms and baldness, and 
women's success under these conditions, 
would pose the deepest challenge to our 
assumptions about gender. From this 
perspective, law should be used to eliminate 1 ,  
not only gender-based lines but the very ,'i 
esistence of gender categories. a
-The first of the feminist solutions would 
open the public world to more 1 
women. The second would make the world 
safer for unconventional women. Either 
choice would leave some women vulnerable, 
yet lawyers, unlike theorists, cannot avoid 
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